INTRODUCTION
Most research on corporate governance and boards has focused theoretically and empirically on large corporations (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004) . Whilst research in small firms has grown substantially, relatively limited attention has thus far been paid to their boards and governance structures (Fiegener, 2005; Fiegener, Brown, Dreux & Dennis, 2000a , 2000b Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000) . There is, however, an emerging consensus that boards in small firms may constitute an important organizational asset (Certo, Covin, Daily & Dalton, 2001; , that boards can add an important strategic dimension to small firms (Brunninge, Nordqvist & Wiklund, 2007; Fiegener, 2005; Zahra, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2009 ) and that small firm board and governance structures can influence firm value creation (Certo, Daily & Dalton, 2001; Huse, 2000) .
Extant research identifies both differences and similarities in corporate governance and boards in large and small firms. In large corporations, assumptions about separation of ownership and control along with divergent utilities of managers and shareholders sharpened the focus of research and governance practice on the monitoring and control role of boards (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 , Daily et al., 2003 Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010) . Whilst agency problems are also relevant to the small firm context, decision-making and control structures here are less complex and diffuse compared to large firms resulting in a comparatively diminished boards' monitoring role (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . The type and content of boards' service and strategy tasks also vary between small and large firms (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) , and at different stages of small firms' life cycle (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003) . Finally, the impact of founders and/or key entrepreneurs on boards and governance may be greater in small firms compared to large ones (Arthurs, Busenitz, makes boards active and effective in task performance, including research on the range of tasks boards perform (Pugliese et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel, Van Gils & Voordeckers, 2005) . In trying to answer questions about the determinants of board effectiveness, researchers have increasingly paid attention to board team processes and behaviors rather than structural characteristics of boards alone (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999) , using direct observations and/or primary data rather than relying on traditional archival methods.
Focusing on board team processes, we investigate the effects of board leadership in small firms on board strategy involvement. Only a few studies have examined the role of board leadership in small firms and these tended to explore the antecedents and performance outcomes of structural leadership characteristics such as CEO duality (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Daily, McDougall, Covin & Dalton, 2002) . Our study extends that body of knowledge by drawing on a team production approach as a novel theoretical perspective to investigate board leadership processes in small firms. By focusing on how leadership relates to small firm boards' strategy involvement, this paper also aims to respond to calls for more theoretical and empirical research on determinants of strategy involvement (Fiegener, 2005; Kim, Burns & Prescott, 2009 ).
The article is structured as follows. Following a brief introduction to the literature on board strategy involvement in small firms, we outline our theoretical approach and derive hypotheses. We then discuss the methods used including our sample, variable measurements, data collection and analysis methods. Following the presentation of our results, we discuss their implications for research and practice before concluding with areas for further research. 
Board Strategy Involvement in Small Firms
Research on boards' involvement in strategy has been prolific (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Golden & Zajac 2001; Pugliese et al., 2009 ) for a number of reasons. First, boards' involvement in strategy is increasingly viewed as a core contribution to firms' value creation processes (Demb & Neubauer, 1990; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Pugliese et al, 2009 ) despite some evidence to the contrary (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001) . Hence, research into boards' strategy involvement has been motivated by the need to understand the links between board and firm performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001) . A second and related reason is that the debate on active versus passive boards has coalesced around boards' strategy involvement as a key differentiator between these (Castro, de la Concha, Gravel & Perinan, 2009 , Pettigrew, 1992 Rindova, 1999) . McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) , for example, argue that an active board does not just ratify and control strategy, it is also involved in formulating strategic decisions as well as defining and shaping which decisions are to be taken in particular contexts. Thus, boards' strategy involvement may be seen as a key indicator of board performance and effectiveness (Stiles, 2001) . Third, boards' strategy involvement is a complex multi-dimensional construct and has been approached from a range of theoretical perspectives (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Pugliese et al., 2009 ). This theoretical pluralism has presented both opportunities and challenges for empirical research and the practical implications derived from it (Pugliese et al., 2009) . Despite the impressive advancements in knowledge in boards' strategy involvement, some unanswered questions remain. Not only is the empirical evidence on boards' strategy involvement inconclusive, there is a lack of empirical studies investigating the phenomenon in contexts other than large Anglo-American boards.
Some notable exceptions notwithstanding (Fiegener, 2005; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) , we lack knowledge on antecedents of boards' strategy involvement in small firms. Entrepreneurship and small business scholars have long called for research not only on the content but also the process of strategic decision-making in small firms (Dess, Lumpkin, & McGee, 1999; Sandberg, 1992) .
Further, the role of teams and leadership in strategic decision-making processes in small firms is not yet fully understood (West, 2007) . This paper builds on team production approach to boards and governance (Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & Englander, 2005) to address these gaps.
Board Dynamics in Small Firms: A Team Production Approach
Small firms are often characterized by concentrated ownership, and the appropriateness of agency theory as a theoretical lens in such contexts has been questioned (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2001; Uhlaner, Floren & Geerlings, 2007) .
When relaxing assumptions about managerial opportunism and the separation of ownership and control, we need alternative theoretical perspectives to explain governance phenomena and board behaviors (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005) . One such alternative is the team production theory of the firm (Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & Englander, 2005) . The seeds of team production theory sprang from microeconomics when Alchian and Demsetz sought to explain cooperative behavior of individuals in work teams vis-à-vis opportunism and shirking, and the emergence R e v i e w C o p y 6 of hierarchies in response to team production problems (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Blair & Stout, 1999) . Whilst the micro-economists provided the basic tenets, it was the later contributions from other disciplines, including law and sociology, that fleshed out team production theory (Blair & Stout, 1999; Blair, 2005) . In the contemporary team production perspective, firms are conceptualized as a nexus of team-specific assets, invested by shareholders, board members, managers, employees, and other stakeholders who hope to profit from team production (Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & Englander, 2005) . As such, team production theory has resonance with resource-dependency theory and a stakeholder perspective, but resolves the decision-making and rent-allocation ambiguities inherent in these theoretical approaches by introducing the concept of a mediating hierarchy (Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & Englander, 2005) . Instead of explicitly contracting with each other in order to determine their share in team production, team members surrender decision-making powers on the allocation of duties and rewards to a mediating hierarchy. In doing so, the mediating hierarch's function further extends to "encouraging firm-specific investment in team production by mediating disputes among team members…" (Blair & Stout, 1999: 772) . In a firm perspective, the mediating hierarchy function is performed by the board which at the apex of the firm's decision-making mediates between all team members that have invested firmspecific resources in order to encourage team production (Blair & Stout, 1999) .
Consistent with Blair and Stout's (1999) notion of several levels of mediating hierarchies in firms, the board in itself is also a team that co-produces values (Forbes & Milliken, 1999 (Kaufman & Englander, 2005) .
In the context of small firms, the overlap between ownership and management, the lack of a formalized managerial structure, as well as the need to bring critical resources into the firm (Arthurs et al., 2009; Cowling, 2003) make the team production approach a useful theoretical lens for understanding boards, especially the determinants of strategic involvement of boards. Following the logic of team production theory, boards are viewed as cooperative teams that contribute to firms' value creation through their strategy involvement. Each board member brings specific and firm-relevant knowledge to the team, a key characteristic of team production approaches (Kaufman & Englander, 2005) . Board leadership is about effectively facilitating the presence and the use of firm-relevant knowledge and skills of board members (Huse, 2007) . Further, boards are social systems, the effectiveness of which is determined by how board members share knowledge and interact (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Leblanc, 2005) . Board leadership therefore also includes the design of effective interactions in boardrooms by means of rules and instructions as well as having skilled chairpersons exhibiting leadership behaviors.
To summarize, following a team production perspective we argue that board leadership is not a single-dimensional but a multi-dimensional construct. It includes processes for ensuring board members bring relevant knowledge to the boardroom, the design of interactions that facilitate the use of knowledge and skills, as well as chairperson leadership behaviors that maximize team production. In that line of argument, board leadership is a major determinant of board strategy involvement and R e v i e w C o p y 8 a central mechanism to bring out the board's value creating potential Leblanc, 2005) .
Board Members' Knowledge
A key issue of board leadership is to ensure that board members have relevant knowledge (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) . The provision of knowledge and skills may directly influence firm's value creating capabilities, especially if such knowledge is firm-and industry-specific, including knowledge of critical technology and industry's characteristics, competitors' main features, and product/market developments (Kaufman & Englander, 2005) . Furthermore, board members' knowledge can prevent 'process losses' associated with highly interdependent and episodic teams and help board members to mutually build on each others' professionalisms (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) . In other words, board members 'must elicit and respect each others' expertise, build upon each others' contributions, and seek to combine their insights in creative, synergistic ways' (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 496) .
Boards' knowledge and skills are particularly relevant in small firms for two reasons. First, small firms are typically characterized by a scarcity of resources, especially financial and managerial ones (Brunninge et al., 2007; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004) . Board members' knowledge and skills that are firm-specific can therefore supplement the firms' internal knowledge and skills base provided by managers.
Board members' knowledge and skills can also be a way to secure the provision of advice and new ideas more cost efficiently compared to hiring external consultants.
Second, small firms often exhibit a dominance of entrepreneurialism over managerialism, with emphasis on action orientation and real-time strategies 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48 Johannisson & Huse, 2000) . Thus, boards in small firms will typically be concerned with giving timely and substantive support to the firm's CEO and other top executives who often lack wider competences and experiences (Borch & Huse, 1993; Minichilli & Hansen, 2007) . In this context, board members' knowledge may act as a substitute for top executives, who may not plan strategic actions in a structured way (Lynall et al., 2003) .
Board members' knowledge has already been investigated as a determinant of board task involvement. Pugliese & Wenstøp (2007) , for instance, found that knowledge of board members in small firms is positively related to the boards' involvement in strategic tasks. Minichilli & Hansen (2007) found that board advisory task involvement is related to knowledge, but also that these relationships were moderated by the event of crisis. Based on the arguments above we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between board members' knowledge and board strategy involvement in small firms.
Board Development
The team production approach highlights the problems of shirking and the need to put board members' knowledge and skills to use (Blair & Stout, 1999; Kaufman & Englander, 2005) . The presence of knowledge per se does not imply that board members will use their knowledge (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) .
There is thus a need for board leadership and board development to ensure that the knowledge and skills are properly used (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) . We define board development as the processes which facilitate board interactions, board working style and utilization of board member's knowledge. As (Conger, Finegold & Lawler, 1998; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch, 1995) . The practice of such board development allows board members to get involved in various board activities and tasks (Demb & Neubauer, 1992) . Further, such initiatives are a way of turning a collection of individual directors into the working group of a board team (Leblanc, 2005) , in other words, facilitating team production. Consequently, the process of board development is believed to exert a strong influence on board task performance (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000) .
Board development is particularly important in small firms for three related reasons. First, small firms are often characterized by a lack of formal structures and a dominance of informal processes (Uhlaner, Wright & Huse, 2007) . While informality may give flexibility, it can also increase uncertainty among board members and centralize decision-making in a way that hampers long-term strategic development.
Formal board development processes can thus give structure to the strategic process in small firms and facilitate a greater involvement by board members. Second, governance in small firms is often characterized by role integration (Johannisson & Huse, 2000) and division between various governance tasks are not always evident (Cowling, 2003) . In small firm boards, formal instructions and evaluations may help to define board members' tasks and to clarify the relationship between the chairperson, the board members and the top management (Conger et al., 1998; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000) . Third, following the team production logic, board development processes are essential in order to transform a collection of individuals into a team that is collectively involved in strategic decisions. Theoretically and empirically, this logic is heightened in a small firm context where we are more likely (Arthurs et al., 2009; Fiegener, 2005; West, 2007) .
We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between board development and board strategy involvement in small firms.
The Chairperson's Leadership Efficacy
The individual who has the greatest ability to shape board leadership is possibly the board chairperson (Leblanc, 2005) . Roberts et al. (2005) argued that the role of the board chairpersons is "vital to the board members' engagement in various ways", and "their own conduct does much to set the culture of the board" (p. S15). As proposed above, the board is a social system and it contains board members with a mix of personalities, skills and motivation that may influence how they individually and collectively engage in board task performance (Huse, 2007) . The chairperson's leadership behaviors have the potential to influence board effectiveness.
The basic premise of the team production approach is that the productivity of any board member is greater as a result of the interaction with other board members (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) . To secure positive team outcomes, the board chairperson is expected to lead individual board team members in order to "… meld the board into a cohesive group, and to make each individual director feel that he or she is equal" (Huse, 2007: 201) . As Leblanc (2005) pointed out, it is doubtful that a strong, engaged board will have a weak chairperson or that an ineffective board will have a strong and skilled leader. In practice, board chairpersons range from effective to neglectful, from domineering to self-serving. Letendre, 2004; Dulewicz, Gay, & Taylor, 2007) . While the CEO leads employees in everyday company settings, the board chairperson is the one motivating and leading the board. Hence, the chairperson's role can be portrayed as that of an orchestrator of an elite group of individuals which meet episodically (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) , and whose competences and knowledge need to be coordinated, integrated and developed towards team efficacy (Wu, Tsui & Kinicky, 2010) .
From a team production perspective, the chairperson's leadership efficacy may be an especially important determinant of board strategy involvement in small firms.
Boards in small firms are characterized by a relative scarcity of resources, or inputs to team production (Cowling, 2003) , because of their small size and common dominance of internal board members. Daily and Dalton (1992) argue that board leadership is likely to be especially visible and important for coordinating the scarce resources towards creating an effective board in small firms. For instance, in addition to leading the internal board work, chairpersons in small firms are particularly important in securing efficient management of external network contacts (Borch & Huse, 1993) .
This includes gaining the legitimacy that small firms sometimes lack compared to their larger counterparts (Davis & Pett, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1965) . Further, there is typically a greater amount of concentration of power in the hands of one or a few individuals in small firm boards. These individuals tend to be both owners and board members in small firms (Brunninge et al., 2007; Eddleston, 2008) . To facilitate board members' involvement in strategy in the midst of this concentration of power in small (Johannisson & Huse, 2000) . In such a context, the chairperson's leadership efficacy can be viewed as a competence that supplements and/or coordinates substantive board resources (Collis, 1994; Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson, 2006) . Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the board chairperson's leadership efficacy and board strategy involvement in small firms.
Moderating Influences of Board Structure
We argued that leadership efficacy of the board chairperson is of particular importance in a team production perspective. Given this prominence, we further explore the importance of chairperson leadership under two contingent structural conditions typical for small firms. The first is when there is CEO duality, i.e. when the CEO of the firm is also the board chairperson; the second is when there has been a recent change in board composition.
A main theme in the literature about board leadership is CEO duality (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson. 1998) . Advocates of CEO duality argue that it is useful to reinforce the leadership structure of the firm by providing 'unity of command' and mitigating ambiguity about key responsibilities (Anderson & Anthony, 1986 ).
However, agency-theoretic arguments imply a separation of the two positions (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . The CEO duality discussion has been developed in the large firm context where monitoring and control tasks of the board have been prioritized, often (Rechner & Dalton, 1991 ). Yet even here agency-theoretic arguments for the separation of CEO/chairperson roles are disputed. Theoretically, stewardship theory contests both the assumptions and prediction of agency theory and proposes instead CEO/chair duality (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998) .
Empirically, there is no conclusive evidence of any systematic relationship between CEO/chairperson leadership structure and firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998) .
Conceptually, the CEO duality debate is pre-occupied with the monitoring tasks of boards with relatively less attention being paid to boards' strategic involvement (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel & Bierman, 2010; Uhlaner, Wright & Huse, 2007) .
Contextually, small firms differ from the large ones in several important ways, including more concentrated ownership structures and role integration, making CEO duality a much more common phenomenon in the small business setting (Cowling, 2003; Daily & Dalton, 1993) . Recent research into CEO duality in firms with high levels of strategic, or concentrated, ownership supports the argument that in such contexts duality positively impacts firm performance (Chahine & Tohme, 2010).
Our argument, however, is not about CEO duality per se, rather we are interested in how the presence of CEO duality affects the relationship between chair leadership efficacy and board strategy involvement. We proposed that in team production theory, the leadership efficacy of the chairperson, that is chairpersons' behaviors aimed at melding the board team, is positively related to boards' strategy involvement. An additional theoretical argument from team production is the need for a mediating hierarch to resolve actual or potential decision-making ambiguities (Blair & Stout, 1999) . Under conditions of CEO/chairperson separation, this mediating A second contingent situation related to board leadership is that of recent changes in board composition. From a team production perspective a change in board composition, regardless of the nature (insider/outsider balance) of such a change, creates a discontinuity in the board team dynamics. New and old board members alike require socialization into the re-constituted team in order to develop trust, and to understand and accept the working style of the board. As a consequence, a change in board composition may temporarily reduce team production. We expect this argument to be particularly relevant in small firms. To a greater extent than in large firms, boards in small firms tend to be characterized by people who have close and trustbased ties to each other, such as family and friends (Brunninge et al., 2007) . Boards in small firms also tend to be smaller in size than in large firms . In small firm boards composed of a small group of people with strong ties to each other, we can expect that routines are established with regard to the board's role in strategy (Johannison & Huse, 2000) . From a team production perspective, these two (Brundin & Nordqvist, 2008) . In other words, the change in composition has a negative impact on board strategy involvement because the change is dramatic enough to disrupt the working style of board. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between recent changes in board composition and subsequent board strategy involvement in small firms.
Building on the previous arguments about the nature and impact of leadership efficacy in boards, firms that have experienced a recent change in board composition have a stronger need for a leader whose behaviors and skills ensure that the board continues to work as a cohesive team (Leblanc, 2005) . A change in the board composition, regardless of its effects on the insider/outsider ratio in the board, accentuates the need for leadership efficacy to re-configure the boardroom culture and extend it to new board member(s) (Huse, 2007) . From a team production perspective, the 'social side' of board work, for instance, to build personal relationships and to coach individual members to find their role in the new board and to make them feel confident to contribute is a key feature of the board chair's leadership efficacy.
We expect the social side of board leadership efficacy to be particular important to weaken the negative effect of changes in board composition in small firm boards. This is because boards in small firms are generally characterized by an informal working style based on personal relationships and close ties between members of the board (Daily & Dalton, 1992; . In other words, the role of the social interaction led by 
METHODS

Sample and Data Collection
The hypotheses are tested through a quantitative study based on survey data in Norway. The Norwegian governance system exhibits both similarities and differences to that found in other countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) . Historically, the state had greater influence in business affairs compared to Anglo-American countries, and this continues to manifest itself in government ownership, especially of large listed companies, and a strong regulatory regime affecting governance including mandatory women and employee representation on boards. But there are also similarities. The
Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance exhibits many commonalities to other international codes, including board structures and the division of responsibilities between boards, shareholders and management (NUES, 2010) .
Norway is also well known for its tradition of having small firms with active boards (Huse, 1990) , and hence it is a particularly useful empirical setting for our research. Norwegian crowns (or between 1 million and 10 million USD at the then exchange rate). We based our definition of 'small' on the official EU definition whilst using a lower limit of 5 employees to exclude micro-enterprises (European Union, 2003).
Market Select is one of several agencies providing data drawn from the Public
Norwegian Company databases at Bronnoysund, which contain all Norwegian firms.
We used the small firm data subset from Market Select, based on our definition above. There was no ex ante indication of the existence of boards in these firms.
Responses were received from 973 firms, and 498 of these declared the existence of a board of directors. Of those firms, only 347 provided complete responses on all the board-related survey measures we used in our analyses, and fitted our size definition. Pettigrew, 1992) , governance studies incorporating primary data are usually based on a single respondent, typically the CEO (e.g. Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Zahra, Neubaum & Huse, 2000; Zhang, 2010) . In line with previous studies, we consider the CEO as the best possible key informant because he/she is knowledgeable about the phenomena pertinent to our study, and better placed than other board members to report on these. Furthermore, having multiple responses in some specific circumstances can enhance the risk of constructing averaged measures which reflect divergence across reports, rather than representing the constructs being investigated (Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993) . In our case, we also collected responses from chairperson efficacy was not tested for due to potential self-rating bias), and these were significant and positive.
In order to deal with common method bias (Doty & Glick, 1998), we applied a number of procedural remedies in the instrument development and data collection phase (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003) . First, we protected the respondents' anonymity by assuring confidentiality of their responses in the cover letter that accompanied the survey. Second, we invested considerable time and effort in improving the scale items and reducing item ambiguity. All survey questions were Dillman, 2000) . To enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, we conducted pre-tests (Fowler, 1993) , including pilot surveys, interviews and boardroom observations, to assist us in the fine-tuning of the questionnaire and in identifying potentially misleading items (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001 ). Moreover, we carefully worded questions to minimize the likelihood of a social desirability bias, using inputs from the pilot interviews. All our questions were close-ended, but to reduce possible common method bias we used both five and seven point scales.
We also performed some of the statistical remedies for common method bias suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003) . First, we used Harman's one factor test. The exploratory factor analysis of the items measuring all perceptual variables exhibits more than one factor with eigenvalues higher than 1.0, thus suggesting that the majority of the variance between the variables cannot be accounted for by one general factor (common method variance). Second, we used the partial correlation procedure to control for the effects of method variance (Lindell & Whitney, 2001 ). The results suggest that common method bias does not appear to be a problem in our data. Third and most importantly, in order to enhance the reliability of our measures, we averaged all perceptual measures in the two time points (2004 and 2005) in order to reduce the perceptual bias of the respondent (in our case the CEO).
Variables and Measures
Both dependent and independent variables are based on multiple-item constructs, and all items were measured through Likert-type scales. Boards' strategy involvement was measured using four items which represent the different aspects boards of directors are supposed to contribute to in relation to the strategy process. These measures were previously validated in other studies (Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009 ). Accordingly, we used statements about the degree to which the board has been involved in: i) actively initiating strategy proposals; ii) making decisions on long term strategies and main goals; iii) implementing strategy decisions; iv) controlling and evaluating strategy decisions (Minichilli et al., 2009; van Ees, van der Laan & Postma, 2008 
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
The independent variables included in the study are board knowledge, board leadership efficacy variable was measured by asking the CEO the extent to which the board chairperson was especially skilled in: i) motivating and using each board member's competence; ii) formulating proposals for decisions and summarizing conclusions after board negotiation; iii) chairing board discussions without promoting his/her own agenda (Leblanc, 2005; Huse, 2007) . The Cronbach alpha for the final variable is .83.
Interactions
As to interaction variables, we computed the following additional variables. 
Control Variables
Boards should not be studied without paying attention to its context, and certain contextual variables are frequently used in board research (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) . In this article, we categorize contextual control variables in groups at different levels. At a general level, we controlled for industry characteristics, firm and CEO characteristics; at the board level, we controlled for the so called 'usual suspects' of board research (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003) .
Industry characteristics potentially influence strategy involvement of boards (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Haynes & Hillman, 2010) , and this may be especially evident in high-technology firms (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003) . Accordingly, we controlled for industry characteristics by using a dummy variable (1= high-tech firm). At firm level, we controlled for firm size, firm age, and also whether the firm is the parent company. Firm size and firm age are among the standard external controls, whereas headquarters are believed to potentially exert an influence on strategy involvement (Brunninge et al., 2007; Huse, 2000) . The firm size was measured as number of employees, and a logarithmic transformation allowed adjusting for skewness. Firm age was measured as a logarithmic transformation of the number of years the firm had existed, regardless of its type of incorporation. With respect to CEO characteristics, we controlled for CEO ownership (Gabrielsson & (Boeker, 1989; 1997) . These factors are considered to influence board strategy involvement across CEO life cycle evolution (Shen, 2003) . CEO ownership was measured as the percentage of shares held by the CEO, while CEO tenure was computed as the number of years the CEO had served in office in the firm. The items refer to the firms' situation at the end of 2004 and all were taken from questions in the survey.
The controls for the 'usual suspects' refer to the traditional board demographic variables used in board research, and include the number of board members (board size), the inside/outside ratio, the board members' shareholding and the CEO duality (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003) . Board size was measured as the total number of board members (Zahra et al., 2000) with a logarithmic transformation allowing adjustment for skewness. For the inside/outside ratio we computed the insider ratio, measured as the percentage of inside executives over the total number of board members (Mallette & Fowler, 1992) . Board members' shareholding was measured as the ratio of board members' shareholding to total shareholding, and it included shareholding by inside directors (Kosnik, 1987) . The variable CEO duality was coded 1 if the CEO was also the chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994) .
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in table 1. Table 2 shows means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression analyses. Table 2 shows generally low levels of correlation among the predictors we used for the analyses and the dependent variable. Based on this preliminary analysis, we conducted VIF analysis after each regression to check for multicollinearity. VIF values range from 1 to 3, thus indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in our study (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & Wasserman, 1996 ).
-Insert table 1 about here-
RESULTS
The hypotheses were tested through hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses. Before running the analyses we examined potential problems in the variables' distribution with respect to the assumptions of hierarchical regression analysis. Residual analyses were conducted, but no results were found that changed the main conclusions. Statistical conclusion validity can be found, but inferences to causal relationship must be done with care when using cross-sectional without longitudinal data. Causal relationships will be discussed in the interpretation of the results. The linear regression analyses were conducted stepwise in order to capture the contribution of each set of variables to the model significance. When testing the hypotheses we thus combined the interpretation of F-change results in the linear regression with the beta coefficients in the models ( 
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this article was to explore how board leadership in small firms contributes to board strategy involvement. We have used an empirical setting from
Norway to investigate what makes boards in small firms involved in strategy. Our findings have both implications for theory and for practice, and they provide support for the use of team production theory when studying boards. To this end, we will start discussing the importance of leadership in board research, before going on to argue how evidence from this study may have implications for boards and managers.
Board Strategy Involvement in Small Firms: Leadership Matters
We have in this article contributed to the debate about boards in small firms by investigating how board leadership affects boards' strategy involvement. Extant research in small firms has rarely investigated determinants of strategy involvement of boards, despite its acknowledged significance for small firms' performance (Fiegener, 2005) . Even fewer studies have investigated leadership in small firm boards, and those tended to focus on structural leadership characteristics (Daily & Dalton, 1992 . Grounded in a team production perspective, we conceptualised board leadership as a multi-dimensional construct based on group processes and behaviors (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) . As we argued, effective board leadership from a team perspective requires both the presence and use of firm-relevant knowledge, which has been recognized as a key characteristic of team production in boards (Kaufman & Englander, 2005) .
Consistent with our predictions, board members' knowledge was shown to have a consistently significant impact on board strategy involvement. This is in line with theoretical arguments, according to which the presence of relevant knowledge at the R e v i e w C o p y 28 board level is a determinant of board involvement in board tasks, including strategy (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) . The adoption of a team production perspective, however, suggests that the presence of board knowledge does not imply per se that board members will use their knowledge effectively (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) . Rather, the creation of a process-oriented boardroom culture (Huse, Minichilli & Schoning, 2005) requires initiatives for board development to be in place (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 In summary, we have demonstrated that conceptualizing board leadership as a behavioral and process-based phenomenon has greater explanatory power for small firm boards' strategy involvement than structural leadership characteristics alone. Our findings contribute to the emerging body of knowledge on process-based board research (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) by shedding new light on the concept of board leadership in a small firm context. Whilst such leadership in governance may be especially visible and impactful in small firms, our novel theoretical approach also opens new avenues for board research in general.
Implications for Theory: Team Production
We proposed the team production perspective of the firm as a theoretical lens for studying board leadership. Rather than viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts between principals and agents, with the board tasked with monitoring management on behalf of shareholders, team production theory views the firm as a nexus of firm-R e v i e w C o p y 30 specific investments with the board acting as the mediating hierarch to control shirking, resolve decision-making and encourage firm-specific investments which all further team production and value creation (Blair & Stout, 1999) .
Whilst Blair & Stout (1999) developed team production theory at the level of the public corporation, and Kaufman & Englander (2005) indicated its utility for understanding boards, we used the logic of team production theory to investigate the determinants of small firm boards' strategy involvement. We demonstrated that team production theory can contribute to our understanding of board behavior in several ways. First, at the centre of team production is the board team and the outputs generated by the team, rather than individual directors and their distinctive roles (viz.
executive and non-executive). Whilst there have been important contributions to the study of teams in both small business and corporate governance research (Castro et al., 2009; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; West, 2007) , rarely have these been explicitly grounded in team production theory . We argue that team production theory provides a complementary theoretical anchor for further conceptual and empirical work at the level of the board team.
Second, in parallel to the team focus, team production theory advances the notion of the mediating hierarch as a means to stimulate team production and resolve decision-making ambiguities (Blair & Stout, 1999) . In governance research, this 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1996) , by its ability to model processes and behaviors related to leadership rather than structural leadership conditions alone, as we discussed above.
Finally, our theoretical approach is complementary to perspectives such as strategic choice (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) , resource/competence-based views (Zahra et al., 2006) and resource dependency theory in its emphasis on firm value creation (Huse, 2007) . Rather than prioritizing a single actor, as agency theory does in respect of shareholder value, team production theory has at its core the value of the firm per se and recognizes that such value is created by all firm participants, including but not exclusive to shareholders, through the productive use of their firm-specific investments. For board research, team production theory provides an additional theoretical justification for evaluating board performance through its strategic involvement (Pettigrew, 1992; Stiles, 2001) .
We argued that the small firm setting is a particularly pertinent one for testing predictions from team production theory because of small firm characteristics including overlapping governance structures, lack of functional managerial competence, strong owner representation in the boardroom and the prevalent internal wealth creation focus (Brunninge et al., 2007; Cowling, 2003) . However, as a theoretical lens team production theory may also be useful for studies of the large firm setting and may provide fresh insights into antecedents and consequences of leadership in different governance structures and systems. For example, studies of family businesses in different empirical settings have identified the need to study actor behaviors where non-financial goals are important and not just financial shareholder value (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia & Larraza Kintana, 2010; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist & Brush, 2010) , and evidence from international governance research highlights the variety of firm goal orientations (Weimer & Pape, 1999) . Team production theory may bring us closer to understanding governance phenomena is such contexts, since it allows a focus on a wider understanding of value creation.
Implications for Practice
The article has various implications for small firm owners, board members and managers. First, given that board members' firm-relevant knowledge has such a high influence on boards' strategy involvement, the selection of outside board members becomes critical. As such, the assessment of board knowledge should be the mechanism through which owners of small firms make sure that individual knowledge is present, and that it is collectively used by board members through a process of continuous development and learning. Further, it is important also to assess the fit of board members' knowledge with the requirements of the firm's competitive environment, as well as the fit of such collective knowledge with the firm's critical technologies and key products and markets.
A second implication for practice relates to the importance of continuously developing boards in order to create value for firms. Along this line, a belief in the value of board development initiatives permeates most codes of good corporate governance practice (e.g. Higgs, 2003) . Board evaluations represent a formal routine that can facilitate a process-oriented boardroom culture .
Having such an evaluation system enables a more regular and systematic follow-up of board members' contributions to different board tasks, making it easier to detect inefficiencies and to improve the board work (Lorsch, 1995) . It can also help clarify the expectations from each board member and collectively agree the boards' mandate.
The role of regular board development initiatives, such as occasional longer meetings, away-days and training seminars for board members is included in several recent MacAvoy & Millstein, 1998) .
Although the idea of board development initiatives is not new (cf. Cadbury, 1992), small firms have been traditionally excluded from the debate on board practices, and studies on the cross-national convergence of best practices regarding board functioning traditionally focused on large listed corporations (Aguilera & CuervoCazurra, 2004) . Board development in small firms has instead been limited for a long time to bringing an external member on the board. Nevertheless, the importance of the actual board practices is gaining importance also in small firms, and we may expect relevant developments in the near future.
Finally, owners of small firms should also consider the importance of identifying a strong leadership inside the boardroom. With respect to this, scholars have noted the pivotal role of the chairperson in establishing a process-oriented board climate that stimulates discussion and motivates all board members to use their knowledge and skills in the board's work (Huse, 2005) . This study empirically reinforces such theoretical predictions, and suggests to owners and board members that effective leadership has a strong impact on board involvement, and particularly on strategy involvement.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Various directions for further research are possible. First, our results emphasize how certain board working structures and process-oriented boardroom dynamics deserve further research efforts. A potentially fruitful line of inquiry may be to link research in the board process tradition with that of the literature on team and entrepreneurial learning (Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes & Hitt, 2009; Lumpkin & Lichtenstein, 2005) . Future studies may also include observations from other board respondents order to validate measures on sub-samples.
Finally, our study is based on 140 firms in Norway. As we already discussed, the number of firms significantly reduced when considering responses for both time periods (2004 and 2005) from identical firms, and the challenge is to increase the number of observations when simultaneously using multiple answers from the same firms in different time periods. Although the Norwegian governance context has many similarities to other countries (Zhang, 2010) , there are also differences most notably the regulatory framework, the prevalence of active small firm boards and concentrated ownership structures (Randoy and Goel, 2003) . These specificities of the Norwegian context made it a particularly useful empirical setting for our research.
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